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Abstract
UK bookies (bookmakers) herd geographically in less-affluent areas. The present work shows that UK bookies also herd
with the special bets that they advertise to consumers, both in their shop window advertising and on TV adverts as shown
to millions of viewers. I report an observational study of betting adverts over the 2014 soccer World Cup. Bet types vary
in complexity, with complex types having the highest expected losses. Bookies herded on a common strategy of advertising
special bets on two levels: by almost exclusively advertising complex bet types with high expected losses, and by advertising
representative events within a given complex bet type. This evidence is most consistent with bookies’ advertising targeting a
representativeness heuristic amongst bettors. Bookies may know how to nudge bettors toward larger losses.
Keywords: gambling, sports betting, bookies, bookmaking, advertising, representativeness heuristic.
1 Introduction
The “specials” have long been a feature of soccer betting in
British bookies. Special bets on the day’s events are sent
from a central office to an individual bookie’s manager, and
then heavily promoted. Originally specials were on hand-
written boards, but they are now typically shown on posters
or electronic screens. Betting shops have historically been
visually unappealing; law prevents the interior of a betting
shop from being visible to passers-by. The Gambling Act
of 2005 relaxed these rules, allowing bookies to advertise in
their windows: Bookies now advertise the specials and pro-
motions for other forms of gambling on large shop window
posters (Figure 1).
UK bookies cluster in less-affluent areas (Ramesh, 2014).
Although this finding has been contested by the industry, it
has withstood further analysis (Reed, 2014). For example,
on the Walworth Road in traditionally less-affluent south-
east London, seven bookies from five chains—each with its
shop window specials—compete on a few hundred metres
of road.
But the rise of internet gambling, and further Gambling
Act reforms allowing gambling advertising to appear on TV
since 2007, mean the specials have invaded the nation’s liv-
ing rooms. Online bookies enable betting throughout a soc-
cer match with “in-play” betting, and advertise specials on
TV either before the match or during the half-time break.
TV specials provide the odds on special bets as the match
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is happening. More betting firms are beginning to advertise
their specials on TV. In 2012 4.1% of all TV advertising was
for gambling (Ofcom, 2013).
This paper reports an observational study of bookies’ spe-
cials over the 2014 soccer World Cup. Bookies herded in
their advertising on two levels. First, bookies concentrated
their advertising on a few specific bet types with high ex-
pected losses for bettors. But bookies also advertised similar
representative events within each bet type. Although book-
ies rarely advertised the same specific bet (this happened
31 times in the sample of 437 adverts), bookies nonetheless
used the same strategy in their advertising. It is hypothe-
sized that bookies have herded on a strategy that exploits
bettors’ biases.
1.1 Expected losses of bets
Bookies allow bets to be placed on many different events
within a soccer match, either before a match, or even dur-
ing the match with “in-play” betting apps. The “overround”
is the amount by which a bookie’s odds for a set of mutu-
ally exclusive events exceeds probability = 1. The higher
the overround, the higher bettors’ expected losses will be,
under the condition that bettors are subject to a Dutch book,
with the bookie making risk-free profits. Overrounds are
almost always positive; if a bookie’s odds summed to less
than one, than bettors could make risk-free arbitrage profits,
which can sometimes be achieved by combining the odds
from several bookies (Constantinou & Fenton, 2013). The
overround is commonly used as an estimate of bettors’ ex-





For example, the set of odds quoted on William Hill’s (the
largest chain of bookies in the UK) website for the World
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Figure 1: A typical UK bookie, Ladbrokes. The two posters on the left are advertising special bets: “England to beat Italy
2-0” and “Kane to score the first goal”.
Cup final corresponded to a probability of Germany winning
in normal time of 0.435 (or 13-to-10 in odds form, where a
bet of $10 wins $13 profit if Germany wins), a probability
of a draw of 0.308, and a probability of Argentina winning
of 0.294, then 0.435 + 0.308 + 0.294 = 1.037, overround =
0.037, and expected losses = 3.6%.
These bets, on the three most salient outcomes of a soccer
match, are referred to as “match-winner” bets here. Previous
studies on the fairness of soccer betting odds have primarily
analyzed match-winner bets (Constantinou & Fenton, 2013;
Forrest & Simmons, 2001). They are also the least complex
bets analyzed here, since all of the possible events in a soc-
cer match are partitioned into just three mutually exclusive
events.
Overrounds can also be calculated for bets on more com-
plex events. Bookies offer bets on specific scorelines, where
bettors have to correctly predict the exact final result (e.g.,
Germany to win 1–0, a 0–0 draw, Argentina to win 2–1 etc.),
a more fine-grained partitioning of the possible events in a
soccer match than match-winner bets. Because soccer is a
low-scoring game, most bookies will offer a range of bets
on specific scorelines, which should correctly sum to a set
of mutually exclusive events with probability = 1. While ex-
treme scorelines may happen, (e.g., Germany winning 8–6),
such events are in practice nearly impossible in professional
soccer, and will lead to a tiny downward bias in measured
overrounds. The sum of probabilities from bets on indi-
vidual scorelines from William Hill’s website for the World
Cup final equalled 1.265, or an overround of 0.265 and ex-
pected losses of 20.9%. This shows the large differences in
expected losses between different bet types.
First goalscorer bets frequently featured in 2014 World
Cup specials, e.g. “Thomas Müller to score first”. These
bets are on the first scorer of a goal in the match, mean-
ing that any normative assessment of this bet requires an as-
sessment of relative scoring chances for at least 20 players.
Bookies offer these bets on all players who could take part in
a match, with bets later refunded on all players who did not
play before the first goal was scored (allowing substitutes
to be eligible for the bet). Bookies also allow bets to be
placed on “no-score”, giving a complete set of events which
should normatively sum to probability = 1. Overrounds for
first goalscorer bets can therefore be calculated on a post-
hoc basis after the match. The overround on William Hill’s
eligible first goalscorer bets for the World Cup final trans-
lated to 0.832, or expected losses of 45.4%. This figure was
especially high because five substitutes joined the game be-
fore the first goal was scored.
Scorecaster bets are the final and most complex bet type
discussed here. These bets are a conjunction of scoreline
and first goalscorer bets for a specific team, e.g. “Thomas
Müller to score first and Germany to win 3–1”. Overrounds
could not be calculated for these bets with the data collected
in this study, because betting odds were not available for a
complete set of events (e.g., Thomas Müller could score first
but Germany go on to lose). But scorecaster bets must have
high overrounds because of the already-high overrounds of
their constituent parts.
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1.2 Bettors’ biases
Since betting markets occur in the real world and for real
stakes, they are an ecologically-valid way to explore biases
in probability judgment (Ayton, 1997). Three theories of
biases in probability judgment could be relevant.
Support theory states that the sum of probability estimates
increases as a class of events is unpacked into a number of
constituent elements (Tversky & Koehler, 1994). Compared
to a normative probability judgment, the increased salience
of sub-categories leads to higher total subjective probabil-
ities for unpacked events. An example from Tversky and
Koehler is that the sum of probability ratings of the separate
components of “death resulting from heart disease, cancer
or some other natural cause” was higher than the rating of
“death resulting from natural causes”.
Support theory could thus explain why the implied prob-
ability of a team winning is higher for scoreline than match-
winner bets (since scoreline bets are unpacked to a greater
degree). An earlier study of bookies’ odds for soccer games
found evidence in favor of support theory (Ayton, 1997)
when the disjunctive components of a bet were presented
separately. Support theory predicts that bookies could profit
by encouraging bettors toward finely-partitioned bets which
should be overestimated the most, and the data on over-
rounds in the previous section is in line with this. The proba-
bility of each partition is overestimated, resulting in the sum
of these estimates being too high.
Conjunction bias is the finding that, other things being
equal, participants prefer bets on compound events rather
than simple events (Bar-Hillel, 1973; Slovic, 1969). Impor-
tantly, people do not always suffer conjunction bias. Some
conjunctions seem as implausible as they truly are (for ex-
ample, when flipping a fair coin the sequence H-H-H-H-H
seems less likely than H-T-H-T-T). The conjunction bias is
a weaker version of the “conjunction fallacy”, where partic-
ipants rate P(A&B) > P(A) or P(B), violating the axioms of
probability by rating the probability of a complex event as
higher than one of its constituent elements (Tversky & Kah-
neman, 1983). The conjunction fallacy therefore implies the
conjunction bias. Tversky and Kahneman’s Linda problem
is the best-known example of the conjunction fallacy:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very
bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student,
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrim-
ination and social justice, and also participated in
anti-nuclear demonstrations.
A majority of participants in Tversky and Kahneman’s ex-
periments rated it is as more likely that Linda is a bank
teller and is active in the feminist movement, than Linda
is a bank teller, thereby rating P(A&B) > P(A). Tversky and
Kahneman say this error is due to the description of Linda
being more representative of someone who is active in the
feminist movement, and argue that the “representativeness
heuristic” leads to the overestimation of complex probabil-
ities, although rival explanations of the conjunction fallacy
are still debated (Tentori, Crupi, & Russo, 2013). People
would reason much better if asked for the probability that
Linda is a bank teller and is active in the pro-gun lobby.
Representative events in a soccer match are the favorite
team winning (match-winner bets), the favorite winning by
a high scoreline (scoreline bets), or a star player scoring the
first goal (first goalscorer bets). The favorite winning by a
high scoreline (e.g. Germany winning 4–1) is a highly rep-
resentative event, and may well be overestimated, especially
since bettors may underestimate the number of possible high
scorelines (e.g. 4–0, 3–1 and so on). There are fewer repre-
sentative events involving underdog teams, but 1–0 is repre-
sentative of a poor team winning, since it is easiest to recall
games where an underdog has eked out a narrow win. A
star player scoring the first goal is a highly representative
event that bettors may overestimate. A non-star player scor-
ing the first goal is less salient, but may be actually quite
likely given the number of players in a soccer match (the
combined chances from many non-star players).
Finally, bettors may simply have a preference for bets
with high potential payoffs, because they overweight small
probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Match-winner
bets do not tend to offer high payoffs, as long as the two
teams are somewhat evenly matched. Therefore, bookies
may offer finely-partitioned bets just to satisfy bettors’ pref-
erence for high potential payoffs. If this is the case, then
the odds on offer from advertised specials would be a key
factor.
1.3 Method
On each match day, shop window specials and specials from
inside the shop (defined as any bet prominently advertised
on a poster or electronic screen) were photographed from
shops of at least the four main chains of bookies in the UK,
who own 7,865 of the UK’s approximately 8,700 betting
shops. Specials were recorded from across the UK, but pre-
dominantly from Bristol, London, and Stirling. Shops from
the same betting chain usually ran the same or very similar
specials in each sampled city. The sample of specials ana-
lyzed in this paper is incomplete, but the study was designed
to be as inclusive as feasible.
In total 103 TV specials were recorded by the researcher
using a digital TV with recording and playback features. All
matches except for South Korea versus Belgium were cov-
ered (recording failure). Sixty specials were shown during
the half-time break, with the remainder being shown before
the match had started.
All observed shop window specials were recorded, which
totaled 179 observations across five retail bookies. First
goalscorer, scoreline, and scorecaster specials were also
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Figure 2: Overrounds in three bet types over the 2014World
Cup.





recorded from within individual betting shops, to enlarge
the sample of specials from more salient media. These three
bet types were focused on because of their high frequency in
TV and shop window specials. Within-bookie specials cov-
ered a wide variety of bet types, both within- and between-
bookies, and so it was infeasible to record and analyze all of
these specials.
On the morning of each match day odds of all events were
downloaded as html files from the sites of Ladbrokes, Paddy
Power, and William Hill (a permanent record of odds from
other sites could not be recorded due to these sites being pro-
grammed in flash). These data was then used in the analysis.
This procedure was deemed more accurate than relying on
third party odds-comparison sites to collect data from more
bookies. Data for other bookies were estimated by using
the average odds for each event across these three bookies.
This introduces potential error, but bookies’ odds were very
similar. For example, the mean raw probability of a 1–0
win was 0.11 for either team over all matches and all three
bookies. The between-bookie standard error of these proba-
bilities was only 0.007.
Odds change in the run-up to a match, meaning that some-
times advertised and recorded probabilities for the same
event differed even within a bookie. If this was the case, then
downloaded probabilities were used, rather than making ar-
bitrary adjustments to a complete set of odds (if the proba-
bility on one event decreases, then either the overround may
decrease or the probability on other events may increase).
1.4 Results
Averaged over the 2014 World Cup, overrounds on match-
winner bets for the three bookies were very similar: 0.045
(Ladbrokes), 0.039 (Paddy Power), and 0.059 (William
Hill). Data from oddschecker.com was used to evaluate
whether overrounds on match-winner bets from these three
bookies were representative of the entire industry. Increas-
ing the sample to 56 online bookies revealed an industry-
average overround of 0.051, with a standard error of 0.020,
indicating that these three bookies are representative of the
Figure 3: Percentage of TV and shop window advertising
by bet type.
wider industry.
Averaged over the 2014 World Cup, overrounds on score-
line bets for the three bookies were 0.237 (Ladbrokes),
0.323 (Paddy Power), and 0.282 (William Hill), or 0.281
on average.
Over the whole 2014 World Cup, overrounds on first
goalscorer bets averaged 0.478. Overrounds were slightly
more variable in this bet type, but were uniformly high:
0.464 (Ladbrokes), 0.424 (Paddy Power), and 0.534
(William Hill). While first goalscorer bets often have simi-
lar overrounds to scoreline bets, they can have much higher
overrounds if many substitutes join the match before the first
goal is scored (which is something that bookies cannot per-
fectly predict).1 Figure 2 summarizes recorded overrounds
in these three bet types.
Which bet types featured in bookies’ specials? TV and
shop window specials are the most salient to non-regular
bettors. Figure 3 provides full details on all observed
TV and show-window specials. Eight of 103 TV adverts
were on match-winner bets (7.8%), while match-winner bets
never appeared in collected shop window specials. Over-
all, match-winner bets comprised 2.8% of total advertising
over these two media. First goalscorer bets (27.7%) and
scoreline bets (30.1%) were much more frequently adver-
tised. These bet types have much higher expected losses
than match-winner bets. Bookies also frequently advertised
scorecaster bets (33.0%). The sample is completed by 6.4%
“other” bets. These were complex bets that did not fit neatly
into any of the more frequent categories, such as “Germany
to win and both teams to score”.
Bookies’ advertising had a strong tilt toward complex bet
types with high expected losses; 90.8% of TV and shop win-
dow specials were for bet types with high expected losses.
1But first goalscorer bets are riskier for the bookie than scoreline bets,
since the bookie must refund the bet if the named player does not take part
in the match prior to the first goal.
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Table 1: Summary of data collected. These firms account for 8,131 of the UK’s approximately 8,700 high-street bookies
(numbers from the association of British bookmakers, and from the bookies’ websites). Bet 365 and Betway are online-only
bookies.
Advertising medium Bet type Bet365 Betfred Betway Coral Ladbrokes Paddy Power William Hill Total
TV Match-winner 7 - 1 - 0 - - 8
First goalscorer 35 - 2 - 3 - - 40
Scoreline 30 - 5 - 2 - - 37
Scorecaster 0 - 0 - 4 - - 4
Other 0 - 7 - 7 - - 14
Total 72 - 15 - 16 - - 103
Shop Window Match-winner - 0 - 0 0 0 0 0
First goalscorer - 0 - 0 38 0 0 38
Scoreline - 8 - 0 35 5 0 48
Scorecaster - 0 - 36 0 0 53 89
Other - 0 - 0 4 0 0 4
Total - 8 - 36 77 5 53 179
Within-bookie First goalscorer - 0 - 0 29 3 0 32
Scoreline - 40 - 0 28 0 0 68
Scorecaster - 0 - 54 0 1 0 55
Total - 40 - 54 57 4 0 155
Total 72 48 15 90 150 9 53 437
Number of shops - 1,375 - 1,786 2,268 266 2,436 8,131
This shows that bookies herd by advertising bet types with
high expected losses. See Table 1 for a breakdown of all 437
specials recorded.
There were 263 bets involving the first goalscorer; 110
were first goalscorer bets. Five bets were a conjunction of
first goalscorer and winning team bets (grouped with first
goalscorer bets in the analysis). There were 148 scorecaster
bets, for which the “first goalscorer” part of the bet will be
used in this analysis. Bookies are taking risks with pre-
match bets: First goalscorer bets are refunded if the player
does not take part in the match prior to the first goal, while
scorecasters revert to scoreline bets. Thirty one bets (11.8%)
were shown on TV at half-time. Twenty five, or 10.8% of
the 232 pre-match first goalscorer bets, were non-valid due
to the player not taking part prior to the first goal and were
hence not analyzed.
A player’s probability of scoring the first goal was trans-
formed by subtracting the average probability of a player
in that match scoring the first goal, providing a measure
of above-average scoring likelihood. There were no signif-
icant differences on this measure between first goalscorer
and scorecaster bets, t(236) = 1.05, p = .295, and pre-match
and half-time bets, t(236) = 1.21, p = .227, so the results
were pooled. Instead of randomly selecting players from the
match, the specials were geared toward advertising likely
goalscorers: Advertised players had a probability of scoring
0.098 higher than average. Given that the average player
had a probability of 0.065 of scoring the first goal, adver-
tised players were more than twice as likely as average to
score the first goal. Bookies herded in their advertising of
likely goalscorers in first goalscorer bets. Figure 4 shows
visually the lack of variation in the data.
Bookies frequently advertised bets on specific match
scorelines: 275 pre-match adverts were recorded from seven
bookies (131 scoreline bets and 144 scorecaster bets; half-
time bets were not analyzed since the number of goals
scored in the first half affects the likelihood of various score-
lines). What specific events from these bet types were ad-
vertised to consumers?
“Team strength” was measured via bookies’ probabilities
of a team winning, normalized to the range (0,1), so that a
team with strength = 0.5 was equally likely to win or lose the
match (removing the influence of draws and the overround).
Figure 5 shows team strength on the x-axis; observations are
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 3, May 2015 How bookies make your money 230
Figure 4: Data scatterplot of first goalscorer bets. This lack
of variation between-bookies shows that bookies herded on
a common strategy of advertising likely goalscorers.








grouped by specific scorelines, where 1-0 is statistically the
most likely winning scoreline, 2–1 the second most likely,
and so on. There is a clear trend that as team strength in-
creases, higher (and less likely) scorelines are shown. A
scoreline of 1–0 is most often shown for underdogs (team
strength < 0.5), and scorelines of 3–0 or higher are most of-
ten shown for favorites. There is a bias toward favorites,
with a mean team strength of .618, in line with bookies ad-
vertising representative events.
If bettors overweight small probabilities, bookies’ adver-
tising may be geared toward bets with long odds. Figure 6
plots the potential payoff from all valid pre-match scoreline,
first goalscorer, and scorecaster bets. Odds are presented in
decimal format, a convenient format of odds presentation,
where decimal odds = 1/probability. Decimal odds also rep-
resent the total payoff for a winning $1 bet. There is a large
variation in odds within each bet type, and little overlap be-
tween different bet types. First goalscorer bets have decimal
odds of between 3.5 and 13; scoreline bets range between
5.5 and 34; scorecaster bets range between 17 and 181.
1.5 Discussion
UK bookies cluster in less-affluent areas (Ramesh, 2014;
Reed, 2014). As well as herding geographically, the present
work shows that bookies herd in how they advertise specific
bets to consumers. Bookies herd on two levels, firstly con-
centrating on a few types of bets with high expected losses
(first goalscorer, scoreline, and scorecaster bets—see Fig-
ure 3). Bookies rarely advertise match-winner bets, which
have much lower expected losses than the other three bet
types. But bookies also herd within these three bet types,
by advertising likely goalscorers and by combining favorite
teams with unlikely scorelines and vice versa.
The present work hypothesises that this herding might
Figure 5: Scoreline bets. Team strength for each advertised
bet is shown on the x-axis. Observations are grouped by
scoreline, where 1–0 is the most likely winning scoreline,
2–1 the next most likely and so on. There is a clear pattern
where higher scorelines are advertised for teams of higher
team strength. Scoreline means of team strength are: 1–0
0.42; 2–1 .56; 2–0 0.58, 3–0 plus 0.71.






Figure 6: Distribution of decimal odds for the three main bet
types.





be caused by an exploitation of bettor biases. Support the-
ory correctly predicts that overrounds will increase with the
number of partitions of a bet. However, the very strong
pattern of advertising within each bet type is more consis-
tent with bookies targeting the representativeness heuristic,
as support theory does not make any predictions about spe-
cific partitions being overestimated compared to others. Al-
most all advertised scoreline and first goalscorer bets seem
to tap into notions of representativeness. And by combin-
ing a representative first goalscorer and representative score-
line, scorecaster bets may be made attractive despite offer-
ing high expected losses to bettors.
Figure 6 shows that there is little evidence for bookies
targeting a specific level of risk with their bets: There is
little overlap in the riskiness of the three major bet types.
However, this need not be the case. Bookies could easily
make first goalscorer bets as risky as scorecaster bets by
advertising extremely unlikely goalscorers (for example the
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goalkeeper, a player who almost never scores in open play),
but they prefer to only advertise likely goalscorers, in keep-
ing with representativeness. Similarly, scoreline bets could
be made much riskier by advertising underdog teams win-
ning by unlikely scorelines (an extremely unrepresentative
event), but this advertising strategy was not used.
The large differences in expected losses between different
bet types indicate that simply nudging bettors toward differ-
ent bet types may have a large effect on total losses. Lad-
brokes, Paddy Power, and William Hill are all publically-
listed companies, and revealed in shareholder disclosures
that their gross wins over the 2014 World Cup were 24.3%,
17.3%, and 18.4% respectively. This is over three times
higher than the expected losses from match-winner bets at
these three bookies of 4.3%, 3.7%, and 5.6% respectively.
There remains substantial room to reduce bettors’ losses.
Betting markets constantly change, so this study provides
only a snapshot in time. It is easy to imagine how com-
plex bets may have come to take their current role. Since
complex bets split the event space into ever-finer parti-
tions, a risk-averse bookie would naturally increase over-
rounds every time a level of complexity is added, as in-
surance against professional sports betters exploiting the
greater choice space. But a modern bookie with access to
big data may have discovered the variables which maximize
total profits from complex bets. While bettors may find it
easy to compare odds on match-winner bets, the number
of possible events within complex bet types may make it
harder to shop around for the best deal. Although bookies
all had similar patterns in their advertising of complex bets,
two bookies rarely advertised exactly the same bet (this hap-
pened only 31 times in 437 adverts). While nudges are the
currently favored method of protecting biased consumers
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2008), the sort of nudges present in
bookies’ advertising may be having the opposite effect.
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